Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) with classical Bob has recently been suggested and proven robust. Following this work, QKD with classical Alice was also suggested and proven robust. The above protocols are ideal in the sense that they make use of qubits. However, in the past, well-known QKD protocols that were proven robust and even proven unconditionally secure, when qubits are used, were found to be totally insecure when photons are used. This is due to sensitivity to photon losses (e.g., Bennett's two-state protocol) or sensitivity to losses combined with multi-photon states (e.g., the photon-number-splitting attack on the weak-pulse BennettBrassard protocol, BB84). Here we prove that QKD with classical Alice is still robust when photon losses and even multi-photon states are taken into account.
This photonic qubit lies in a much larger space called Fock space. The first natural extension is |0, 0〉 that describes the lack of photons (the vacuum state), a case of great practical importance, as it enables dealing properly with photon loss. The next extension of a very high practical importance is that |2, 0〉 describes two (indistinguishable) photons in the same qubit-state |1〉, |0, 2〉 describes two (indistinguishable) photons in the same qubit-state |0〉, and |1, 1〉 describes two (in this case, distinguishable) photons, one in the qubit-state |0〉, and one in the qubitstate |1〉. This case (a six dimensional space, describing two or less photons) was found very important in the photon number splitting attack [5] , as prior to that analysis, experimentalists assumed that the only impact of high loss rate is on the bit-rate and not on security.
In general, if a single photon can be found in two orthogonal states (these are called "modes" when discussing photons), then |n 1 , n 0 〉 represents n 1 (respectively n 0 ) indistinguishable photons in a qubit-state |1〉 (resp. |0〉). The numbers n 0 and n 1 are then called the occupation numbers of the two modes. From now on, the notations |0〉 ≡ |0, 1〉, |1〉 ≡ |1, 0〉, |+〉 = ( |0, 1〉+ |1, 0〉)/ 2 and |−〉 = ( |0, 1〉 − |1, 0〉)/ 2 will be used interchangeably. Similarly, since the single photon can also be found in |0, 1〉 x ≡ |+〉 and |1, 0〉 x ≡ |−〉 (namely, the x basis), then |n − , n + 〉 represents n − (resp. n + ) indistinguishable photons in qubit-state |−〉 (resp.
|+〉).
More generally, one may consider more than two modes. For instance, the four modes |n 1b , n 1a , n 0b , n 0a 〉 are the generalization of qu-quadrit (say a photon in one of two arms a or b, and one of two orthogonal polarizations, denoted 0 or 1).
The classical Alice protocol, dealing with losses -The originator Bob sends Alice qubits in the state |+〉 and keeps in a quantum memory all qubits he received back from her [9] . When N qubits have been sent and received, (classical) Alice announces publicly which qubits she reflected (without disturbing them); the originator Bob then checks that he received |+〉 and not |−〉 on those positions (CTRL). For the (SIFT) qubits measured by Alice in the standard (classical) {|0〉; |1〉} basis, a sample is chosen to be checked for errors (TEST). The remaining SIFT bits serve for obtaining a final, secure key, via error correction and privacy amplification, as in any conventional QKD protocol.
Defining the (limited) "photonic QKD with classical Alice" protocol. The qubits are embedded in the 3-dimensional, 2-mode Fock space containing the qubit states |1, 0〉 and |0, 1〉 and the vacuum state |0, 0〉. The Hilbert space describing Alice+Bob states is (for now) the subspace H AB = Span |0, 1〉, |1, 0〉, |0, 0〉 ⊆ F
of the more general 2-mode Fock space (F ). In this photonic protocol, Bob is always sending the |+〉 state. Losses or vacuum states are modeled by the state |0, 0〉, and thus, we must define Alice's and Bob's operations when such states occur. Losses normally come from the interaction with the environment; as usual, the (worst case) analysis gives Eve total control on the environment. Classical Alice can either SIFT or CTRL [2, 3] . In the SIFT mode, Alice's "measurement" is described (WLG) with the adjunction of a probe, extending H AB to H A ⊗ H AB , a unitary transformation and a measurement of her probe in the standard basis. Such a description is meant to match the general framework of measurements in quantum information, and may not correspond to the actual physical measurement performed by Alice. Using the Fock-space notations, it is assumed that Alice adds a two-mode probe in a state |0, 0〉 A to get the state |0, 0〉 A |+〉 AB . Alice then performs one of the following two operations (with |n 1 , n 0 〉 AB in the z, i.e. the standard basis):
then she measures her probe in the standard classical basis and sends Alice+Bob's state to Bob; in the case described by Eq. (2) (CTRL) she needs not measure, still the probe and its measurement are added there only to make the description uniform; Bob's original state ( |+〉 AB ) is reflected back to him, undisturbed. In the case described by Eq. (3) (SIFT), Alice gets the outcome n 1 n 0 , and the state |n 1 , n 0 〉 AB is sent to Bob. Note that, in order to analyze the enlarged space of the protocol, we had to add the definition of Alice's operation on the added state, |0, 0〉 AB . Our choice of U SIFT |0, 0〉 A |0, 0〉 AB = |0, 0〉 A |0, 0〉 AB is the most natural way of extending Alice's SIFT operation, and it thus becomes part of our definition of the protocol "Photonic-QKD with classical Alice".
Naturally, when Bob measures in the classical (z) basis, he also measures the same three states as Alice, |n 1 , n 0 〉 with n 0 + n 1 ≤ 1. However, the space H AB (1) is also spanned by the orthonormal basis { |+〉, |−〉, |0, 0〉}, thus Bob (who is not limited to being classical) can perform a measurement in this generalized x basis of the qutrit.
Eve's attack on the (photonic) classical Alice protocol. Eve performs her attack in both directions; from Bob to Alice, Eve applies U ; from Alice to Bob, Eve applies V . We may assume, WLG, that Eve is using a fixed probe space H E for her attacks in both directions. The attack from Bob to Alice produces a state of the form |E 01 〉 |0, 1〉 AB + |E 10 〉 |1, 0〉 AB + |E 00 〉 |0, 0〉 AB (namely
, where the |E i j 〉 are non normalized (and potentially non-orthogonal) vectors in H E . With Alice's probe attached we obtain 
and after Alice has measured her probe, she gets some output ({00,01,10}), and some (non normalized) residual state that she sends back to Bob.
Once Alice has performed her measurements and sent |i , A proof of robustness. For Eve to stay undetectable, if Alice measured |0, 0〉 (namely, the outcome 00) in the SIFT mode, then Bob should have a probability zero of measuring 01 or 10, thus, a probability zero of receiving the states |0, 1〉 or |1, 0〉. Similarly if Alice measured 10 (01), then Bob should have a probability zero of measuring 01 (10); he could however get a loss, 00. The resulting (non normalized) Eve+Bob residual states thus take the form |ψ ′ 00 〉 = V |ψ 00 〉 = |H 00 〉 |0, 0〉 AB when a loss arrives, and otherwise, In order to check CTRL bits, Bob measures |ψ ′ 〉 in the x basis and checks if he gets a photon in the illicit state |−〉. To avoid that, Eve must make sure that the overlap between Eve-Bob's state |ψ ′ 〉 and Bob's state |−〉 is zero. This results with another limitation on Eve's attack: the norm of AB 〈− |F 01 〉 |0, 1〉 AB + AB 〈− |F 10 〉 |1, 0〉 AB must be 0; namely,
|F 01 〉 = |F 10 〉 = |F 〉 for some (non normalized) state |F 〉 ∈ H E . The final global states (5) if Alice measured 01 and 10 are thus (respectively)
and if Bob does not get a loss, Eve's final state is |F 〉 whether Bob measures |0, 1〉 i.e., the bit 0, or |1, 0〉, i.e., the bit 1. Eve's final probe is, thus, independent of all of Alice's and Bob's measurements, and is unentangled with their state.
Eve can thus get no information on the bits Alice and Bob agree upon without being detectable. That reasoning can be done inductively bitwise to get robustness with N qubits.
The classical Alice protocol, dealing with losses and multiphoton pulses -In practice, there are not just losses: when qubits are encoded using photon pulses, there may be more than one photon per pulse, giving the eavesdropper more tools to get information on the SIFT bits. We now allow the Hilbert space to contain all photonic states of the above-mentioned two modes. Namely, we consider all states |n 1 , n 0 〉 with n 0 + n 1 ≥ 0. As before, we must specify Alice's and Bob's operations on those states.
Defining the (full) "photonic QKD with classical Alice" protocol. If Alice and Bob can distinguish one from more than one photon, extending the results of the earlier section is rather trivial; in brief, Eve becomes limited to the same space as in the previous section, or else she will be noticed.
The interesting extension is when Alice and Bob are limited, and cannot tell a single photon pulse from a multi-photon pulse. It is conventional to say that they have "detectors" and not "counters". This, of course, is in contrast to Eve who has counters, and who can do whatever physics allows.
We now assume a specific realization of the Fock states, to make the limitation on the measurements more clear. We assume that the two classical states, |0〉 and |1〉, describe two pulses on the same arm, such that the photon can either be in one pulse, in the other, or in a superposition such as the (non-classical) state |+〉. Measurements are applied onto the two modes separately, using two detectors, thus a state |1, 1〉 as well as any state |n 1 , n 0 〉 with both n 1 ≥ 1 and n 1 ≥ 1 can be identified as an error. That will be enough to guarantee robustness.
As before, we assume that Alice's CTRL operation is given by Eq. (2), yet now, with n 0 and n 1 being any non-negative integers.
To model properly the use of a detector that clicks when noticing one or more photons, it is assumed that in the SIFT mode Alice still attaches a probe in the |0, 0〉 A state. Now she applies the following transform,
and H AB is F , Alice+Bob's 2-mode photonic space:
Alice then measures her probe in the |0, 0〉 A , |0, 1〉 A , |1, 0〉 A and |1, 1〉 A basis; she cannot distinguish |n 1 , 0〉 with n 1 ≥ 2 from |1, 0〉, yet she can distinguish |1, 1〉 from |1, 0〉. When n 1 ≥ 1 or n 0 ≥ 1 she seesn 1 = 1 orn 0 = 1 (respectively); if both n 1 ≥ 1 and n 0 ≥ 1 then she measures her probe in a state |1, 1〉 A ; this is telling her that the state she received is illicit.
We need to carefully define Alice's operation on the states she receives, as the robustness analysis depends on the residual state after Alice's "measurement", which Alice sends back to Bob; we now consider two legitimate options for defining that state. In one, which we could call "the conventional measure-resend approach", we assume that depending on which detector clicks, the state |0, 1〉 or the state |1, 0〉 (or the state |0, 0〉 if no detector clicked) is then sent back to Bob. However, now Eve could prepare the state ( |0, 2〉 + |2, 0〉)/ 2 and send it to Alice; in CTRL mode the same state will return to Eve, while in SIFT mode only a single photon (or none) will be given back to Eve. Thus Eve (who can measure the number of photons) will easily decode Alice's operation, and will be able to measure (and resend) in case of SIFT, or send the state ( |0, 1〉 + |1, 0〉)/ 2 back to Bob in case of CTRL.
We thus stick here to a different way of defining the residual state after Alice's action: we simply assume that the state |n 1 , n 0 〉 is sent back to Bob in both Eq. (7) and Eq. (2). Incidently, that attack above is an example of a simple tagging attack. In a separate work (in preparation) we present a modified photonic classical Alice protocol that prevents many other tagging attacks, including the one suggested in [6] as an attack against QKD with classical Bob ( [1] ); see also [7] .
Eve's attack on the (photonic) classical Alice protocol. Eve performs her attack in both directions using a fixed probe space H E ; from Bob to Alice, Eve applies U ; from Alice to Bob, Eve applies V . The attack from Bob to Alice produces a state of the form |E n 1 n 0 〉 |n 1 , n 0 〉 AB ∈ H E ⊗ H AB where H AB = F . With Alice's probe attached we obtain
in H E ⊗ H A ⊗ H AB . In particular, if Eve does nothing then |E n 1 n 0 〉 ≡ |E 〉 independently of n 1 and n 0 , and the state in Alice+Eve's hands, prior to Alice's operation, is |E 〉 |0, 0〉 A |+〉 AB . Going back to the general case, if Alice applies U CTRL , then the state in Eve+Alice hands (after Alice's CTRL action) is still |Ψ〉. However, if Alice applies U SIFT , the resulting global state in Eve+Alice's hands is
after Alice has measured her probe she gets some output ({00,01,10,11}), and some complicated (non normalized) residual state (sent then back to Bob) that we soon analyze.
Eve now attacks that residual state on the way back from Alice to Bob using the unitary V acting on both her probe and the state sent by Alice to Bob (see below). Eve then sends Bob his part of the resulting state.
A proof of robustness. Alice's measuring abilities put a constraint on the state |Ψ〉 for Eve not to be detectable: Alice's probability of measuring |11〉 A according to that model must be zero, or else Eve can be noticed. It is thus required that |E n 1 n 0 〉 = 0 for n 1 ×n 0 = 0. Therefore, Eve+Alice's state when Alice applies U SIFT must take the form
Once In order to check CTRL bits, Bob measures |ψ ′ 〉 in the x basis and checks if he gets at least one photon in any illicit state such as |−〉; more precisely, he measures |ψ ′ 〉 in the Fock basis |n − , n + 〉 x corresponding to the x basis of single photon states, and aborts if he gets n − > 0 (if the detector for |−〉 photons clicks). To avoid that, Eve must make sure that the overlap between Eve-Bob's state |ψ ′ 〉 and each state of the form |n − , n + 〉 x with n − > 0 is zero. This results with another limitation on Eve's attack. We clarify in the appendix, sect. C the expansion of the x-basis Fock states |n − , n + 〉 x using the z-basis Fock states |n 1 , n 0 〉 and prove the following:
Lemma -If Bob has a zero probability of measuring any state |n − , n + 〉 x with n − > 0, then |F 01 〉 = |F 10 〉, and |F 0n 〉 = |F n0 〉 = 0 for n > 1.
Letting |F 〉 = |F 01 〉 = |F 10 〉, Eve+Bob's final residual states given by (9), if Alice measured 01 and 10, are reduced to, strikingly, exactly the same states given (for the simpler case) by (6) (respectively). As before, if Bob measures in the z basis and gets a SIFT bit, Eve's final state |F 〉 is the same whether Bob measured 0 or 1 and she thus can get no information on either Alice's measurement or Bob's result: the protocol is completely robust.
Conclusions -From the above analysis we conclude that Bob must in the end, on CTRL bits, get either a loss or exactly the state |+〉, which he thinks he sent. This does not mean that Eve's attack is trivial (namely, she must send |+〉 to Alice, and do nothing on the way back). As the simplest non-trivial attack, Eve could prepare the state |E 〉[ |0, 2〉 + |2, 0〉]/ 2, and apply the transformation V [ |E 〉 |0, 2〉] = |E 〉 |0, 1〉;V [ |E 〉 |2, 0〉] = |E 〉 |1, 0〉 on the way back, without being noticed, but also, without gaining any information, as we proved here.
Discussion -We presented here a proof of robustness for two protocols in which Alice is classical, one that takes photon losses into account, and a more relevant one that also deals with multiphoton pulses. The optimistic conclusion of robustness here is, unfortunately, not the end of the story, and further research is required: First, we dealt in this paper only with the generalization of the qubits of "QKD with classical Alice" into two modes, and we left the case of more modes open. Second, here we let almighty Eve prepare the state; unfortunately, Bob is not as capable as Eve, and in reality, he is the one preparing the state, not Eve; Bob, who tries to generate the state |0, 1〉 x , may be unable to avoid (sometimes) sending the state |0, 2〉 x which will often cause a 11 reading in the computation basis, and destroy the full robustness. Still, there is evidence (yet, no proof) that the classical Alice protocol is more robust than BB84. See appendix, sect. D where we also propose three ways to improve the partial robustness (or the security) of our protocol, and of BB84. [9] If Bob does not hold a memory to keep the qubits, he measures them upon reception at random in the standard (z) or the Hadamard (x) basis. Only CTRL bits measured in the x basis, and SIFT bits measured in the z basis, are used. That does not modify the conceptual proof (but in a security proof it would mean that they need to send more qubits to start with).
[10] A hint that one can do much better: if the two sent states are nearorthogonal, still the probability of a conclusive outcome, when using this procedure, is less than half. 
The procedure is robust against eavesdropping because if he was sent |u 0 〉, and he measured in the { |u 0 〉, |u ′ 0 〉} basis, and he did not get |u 0 〉, then he knows the incoming state has been tampered with; similarly, if he was sent |u 1 〉 and measured |u ′ 1 〉.
For a security analysis one must allow some small probability of noise, hence of errors and/or losses.
If high loss-rate cannot be avoided, which is a typical case in QKD, the Ben92 scheme as described here becomes totally non-robust; Bennett [11] was, of course, aware of this, hence designed his protocol differently. In case high losses must be tolerated, such that (lossrate)
, an eavesdropper can simply catch all the qubits coming out of Alice's hands, measure according to Bob's procedure, and send Bob (via a lossless channel) the proper state only when the measurement was conclusive, else send nothing. This attack was called "conclusive attack" in the past, but later on the term "unambiguous state discrimination" became more popular then the term "conclusive".
It is interesting to note (although not vital for the current paper, hence we skip the details here) that Eve can even do better than Bob, since she is more powerful, using generalized measurements (POVMs) as described in [12] [13] [14] ; see also [15] [16] [17] . Thus it can be shown that even if the lossrate is below
], yet as long as it is above |〈u 0 | u 1 〉|, the protocol is still totally non-robust.
Section B: On the Robustness of the BB84 Scheme
This section should be read after the paragraphs concerning the Fock notations for pulses with indistinguishable photons in the main article.
The photon number splitting attack was introduced in [5]. Here is a short description in the notations and the framework of the current article.
Nondemolition-splitting of two photon pulses
We assume that Eve has an initial probe |0, 0〉 E in the Fock space. Photonic states |n 1 , n 0 〉 sent from Alice to Bob are attacked with U |0, 0〉
The first two equations mean that if two photons in the |0〉 state, i.e. |0, 2〉, or in the |1〉 state, i.e. |2, 0〉, are sent, Eve keeps one. The third equation is required for the same to hold when the two photons are in the |+〉 state, i.e. |0, 2〉 x , or in the |−〉 state, i.e. |2, 0〉 x . Thus, U describes a nondemolition-splitting of two photons if those are prepared in the standard or Hadamard bases. Let us now demonstrate the effect of U in the x-basis. For one photon pulses
To express |2, 0〉 x as a superposition of the states |0, 2〉, |1, 1〉 and |2, 0〉, we need to discuss how to deal with indistinguishable particles; more details can be found in Sect C. The state |2, 0〉 corresponds to two indistinguishable photons in the state |−〉 which is a pulse containing a state similar to | −−〉, but with no importance to the order of the two single-photon states. Because the photons are indistinguishable, we can write
with indistinguishable particles within each term. The state |00〉 means two identical photons in the |0〉 state, and corresponds to |0, 2〉. Similarly the state |11〉 corresponds to two identical photons in the |1〉 state, i.e. to |2, 0〉. Remains, after normalizing, the (already symmetric) state
and that state corresponds to one photon in state |0〉 and one photon in state |1〉 permuted in all possible ways, and then normalized,
+ |11〉 , we conclude that
These two identities are obtained with an alternative method (raising operators) in Sect C 2. From the definition of U above, we can now derive the equalities
Here is the derivation of (B9):
The derivation of (B8) is identical, with '+' everywhere instead of '−'. Equations (B1) and (B2) together with (B8) and (B9) mean that Eve's attack is unnoticed both in the z and the x basis on two identical photons: Bob receives a single photon, "undisturbed", and Eve gets full information when the basis is published.
The PNS attack on the BB84 protocol
In the BB84 protocol [18] , photons go from Alice to Bob. For each choice of basis b (z or x) and each bit chosen randomly, it is assumed that Alice sends |0, 0〉 with probability p 0 , |0, 1〉 b or |1, 0〉 b with probability p 1 , and |0, 2〉 b or |2, 0〉 b with probability p 2 , where |n 1 , n 0 〉 z ≡ |n 1 , n 0 〉. We may assume that p 0 + p 1 + p 2 = 1. We also assume p 2 ≪ p 1 , and a loss rate close to 100%, i.e. F = 1 − (lossrate) ≪ 1.
In N trials, Bob expects F p 1 N single photon pulses from the expected p 1 N single photon pulses coming from Alice. From the expected p 2 N two-photon pulses coming from Alice, the chances that the two photons will be lost in the channel are
2 . The chances that at least one photon reaches Bob are thus 1 − (1 − F ) 2 and so Bob expects a total of
non empty pulses. In the PNS attack Eve makes sure Bob gets the number of pulses he is expecting. If
then the number of two photon pulses emitted by Alice, namely p 2 N , is larger than the number of pulses Bob is expecting. With the non lossy channel, Eve can simply select X two photon pulses from those p 2 N pulses sent by Alice (she is able to count photons), and attack them with the two photon pulse attack (Eq. B1-B9), keep one photon and send Bob the other. She thus sends X single photon pulses to Bob; there is no way for Bob to check for eavesdropping; he receives exactly the number of pulses he is expecting, and as they should have been generated in the first place in the ideal qubit protocol. The BB84 protocol is thus completely non robust as soon as p 2 /p 1 ≥ F /(1−F ) 2 which, to a first order approximation [19] , holds when the rate of two-photon pulses amongst the non empty pulses is larger than F .
Section C: Changing Basis in the Fock Space and the Proof of the Lemma
The quantum states of the photons manipulated by Alice and Bob can be described as states in the Fock space F whose Hilbert basis is given by the Fock states |n 1 , n 0 〉 where n 1 is the number of indistinguishable photons in the |1〉 state and n 0 the number of indistinguishable photons in the |0〉 state. Alice and Bob however also use the Hadamard basis |+〉, |−〉 and we also need to use the Fock states |n − , n + 〉 x as a basis for F , where |n − , n + 〉 x corresponds to n − indistinguishable photons in the |−〉 state and n + indistinguishable photons in the |+〉 state. The states |n 0 , n 1 〉 and |n − , n + 〉 x belong to the same space of states. How are they related? A pulse |n − , n + 〉 x with n − indistinguishable photons in the |−〉 state and n + in the |+〉 state can always be expressed as a superposition of pulses |n 1 , n 0 〉 with n 1 photons in the |1〉 state and n 0 photons in the |0〉 state such that n + + n − = n 0 + n 1 . In this paper, we need to know the coefficients of that superposition when either n + or n − is zero.
The symmetric state method
We already presented formulas for |0, 2〉 x and |2, 0〉 x in Sect B, namely Eq. (B6) and Eq (B7). The very same reasoning can be applied with three indistinguishable photons in the |−〉 state. Expanding |−〉 ⊗3 , which corresponds to three photons in the |−〉 state, thus |3, 0〉 x , gives |000〉 − |001〉 − |010〉 + |011〉 − |100〉 + |101〉 + |110〉 − |111〉 all photons in the |1〉 state we obtain
Of course, |0, 3〉 x gives the same expansion, but with + everywhere. This reasoning generalizes to |0, n〉 x and |n, 0〉 x provided we accept that n −k photons in the |0〉 state and k photons in the |1〉 state corresponds to the equal superposition of all n qubit basis states | j 〉 that have k bits equal to 1 and thus n − k bits equal to 0, i.e. Hamming weight | j | = k. Notice that the number of n-bit strings with Hamming weight k is n k and the normalizing factor is thus n k −1/2 ; the symmetric state representation is
Using the well known (within the quantum information community [20, p 35] ) formula
where H is the Hadamard transform i.e. H|0〉 = |+〉 and H|1〉 = |−〉, we deduce the general formula
as follows: 
Since it is also true that H |+〉 = |0〉 and H |−〉 = |1〉, formulas (C3) and (C4) hold if we move the index x from the left to the right to express |0, n〉 and |n, 0〉 in terms of the |k, n − k〉 x .
send it to Alice, and apply the transformation V [ |E 〉 |0, 2〉] = |E 〉 |0, 1〉;V [ |E 〉 |2, 0〉] = |E 〉 |1, 0〉 on the way back, without being noticed, but also, without gaining any information, as we proved. Although Eve gains nothing from that attack, it is potentially disturbing. It means that Eve can totally deviate from the protocol without being noticed, and such a situation is not desired; it could have a strong impact on security when noise is allowed, and/or when Bob sometimes sends |0, 2〉 x . We now present three ways of improving the protocol and potentially making it more secure (although a security analysis is beyond the scope of this paper); two of these methods prevents Eve from applying the above-mentioned attack.
• Technology improvement: Replacing the detectors by counters that can (at least) distinguish a single photon from more than one photon. Obviously, Alice's ability to distinguish in SIFT mode a single photon from more than one photon prevents the above-mentioned attack. Also, it allows Alice to obtain meaningful statistics in case Bob sometimes sends two photons in the state |0, 2〉 x , as the case of Alice measuring |1, 1〉 can now be compared to the cases of measuring |2, 0〉 and |0, 2〉.
• Algorithmic improvement: by adding more tests into the protocol we can improve its potential security. So far we only discussed the case in which Alice applies SIFT and Bob measures in the z basis, and the case in which Alice applies CTRL and Bob measures in the x basis. However, Alice and Bob can easily add two tests: Alice applies SIFT and Bob measures in the x basis, and Alice applies CTRL and Bob measures in the z basis; such a modification could happen anyhow in real life QKD, because Bob is not currently using a quantum memory; see end note 10 in the main paper. While these tests do not help against the above-mentioned attack they do help having a better estimate of the states Bob generates: in case Bob sometimes generates |0, 2〉 x , this can be noticed as a measurement of (1,1) in both Bob's detectors when Alice employs CTRL and Bob measures in the z basis, and similarly (a detection in both Bob's detectors) when Alice employs SIFT yet does not get (1,1), and Bob measures in the x basis.
• Protocol modification: Let us allow quantum Bob to add more states: We noted that in "QKD with classical Bob" the quantum originator sent not only |+〉 but also other states such as |0〉. Then the quantum originator and the classical party performed their TEST on qubits going from the quantum originator to the classical party. In contrast, in QKD with classical Alice, one only defined the TEST on qubits going back from classical Alice to (quantum) Bob. We could allow our quantum Bob send also the states |0〉 and |1〉 and let him and classical Alice use those added qubits only for an additional TEST, comparing bits when Bob generated these states and Alice applied SIFT. Such a modification trivially prevents Eve from applying the above-mentioned attack, since the protocol involves (on the way to Alice) one of three non-orthogonal states in each transmission, thus if Eve always sends the abovementioned state, she will be easily detected. Each of those modifications could only strengthen the protocol. Potentially they can also be combined together. The use of counters, and the use of tests in different bases could also be helpful for improving BB84.
